

99. It has been learned, since 7 December 1941, that the Japanese task force which attacked Pearl Harbor left Sasebo Anchorage, near the Bungo Channel, sometime between 20 and 22 November 1941, East Longitude Time, and proceeded to Tarakan Bay, Borneo Island, in the Kuriles. The force then assembled and fueled. It departed on or about 25 November 1941, East Longitude Time, and proceeded in an easterly direction to about 170° West Longitude, then southeast to a point about 200 miles from Oahu.

100. The Japanese striking force included three Carrier Divisions, among which were Carrier Divisions 1 and 2. Five days before the attack, the Fleet Intelligence Officer had advised Admiral Kimmel that he could not reliably estimate the location of Carrier Divisions 1 and 2.

101. The Japanese carriers launched their planes from a position 200 miles due north of Oahu.

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 3

Vol. I, No. 22
8 Dec. 1944

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE

U. S. S. NEVADA AFIRE ON 7 DECEMBER 1941

(See story of *PEARL HARBOR* on page 1)

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[1] PEARL HARBOR: THE PLANNING STAGE

When Jap planes struck clustered U. S. warships and aircraft at PEARL HARBOR on 7 December 1941, the enemy was carrying into effect pin-pointed plans conceived months in advance and long cloaked in secrecy. Until recently, little has been known of the planning stage prior to the sneak raid on HAWAII.

The first concrete intimations of early enemy intentions are revealed in the

interrogation of a Japanese Chief Yeoman who worked closely with top-ranking Jap Navy personnel during critical months in mid-1941. The prisoner, who was captured on SAIPAN, had access to highly confidential documents as well as behind-the-scenes rumors while plans for PEARL HARBOR were being perfected.

The prisoner appears both exceptionally intelligent and cooperative. Testimony capable of confirmation from other sources checked closely. Tactical information (as contained in "Weekly Intelligence", Vol. 1, Nos. 2 and 3) proved reliable.

Most remarkable of the POW's assets is his memory of details, as indicated in his reconstruction of the historic Combined Fleet Secret OpOrder #1, of 1 November 1941. This document, reproduced entirely by memory, is believed to be fairly accurately transcribed, and will be printed in full later in this article.

As a yeoman attached to the Staff of CinC Combined Fleet (Admiral YAMAMOTO), the prisoner became familiar with Jap war games. Staffs of the various Japanese Fleets worked these out on a large game board. Games were held frequently, sometimes as often as twice a month.

Prior to late August (1941), war games were held at such anchorages as SUKUMO, SAEKI, KAGOSHIMA, and KANOYA. Close attention was devoted to current experimental data, which was incorporated in tactics employed. Although the prisoner insists that enemy countries were not specifically designated during these games, the identity of possible Jap foes could scarcely have been obscure.

During this period, the prisoner added, there was a constant interchange of personnel between CinC Combined Fleet and the Naval General Staff. Men on these staffs were reportedly "definitely much keener" than members of other Fleet staffs.

Final planning stages were presaged late in August, when CinC Combined Fleet ordered all Fleet Commanders and their key Staff members to TOKYO for further war games. Offices at the Naval General Staff at JAPAN's capital were found inadequate, and the games were thereafter held in the Naval War College. The POW claimed that security measures at the War College were woefully inadequate. Classes at the College continued as usual; "any man with a half-official air could easily have walked in".

On 2 September the final all-important "games" got under way, with an introductory speech to all officers taking part. Rooms were assigned to the "N" Team, the "A" Team, and the "E" Team (Nippon, America, and England) and to the umpires. The teams, composed of virtually every top-notch Jap Naval officer, were made up [2] as follows:

	Rank	Official duties
UMPIRES:		
NAVAL GENERAL STAFF:		
NAGANO, Osami.....	Admiral.....	
FUKUTOME, Shigeru.....	Rear Admiral.....	Head of First Section (War Planes and Operations).
UOZUMI, Jisaku.....	Captain.....	Member First Section.
YAMAMOTO, Chikao.....	Captain.....	Head of Sub-Section, First Sect.
MAYUZUMI, Harue.....	Commander.....	Member " " " "
TAMURA, Saburo.....	Commander.....	" " " " " "
SANAGI, Tsuyoshi.....	Commander.....	" " " " " "
UOZUMI, Yorichi.....	Commander.....	" " " " " "
NAVY MINISTRY:		
TAKATA, Toshitane.....	Captain.....	Member of Military Affairs Bureau.
SHIKI, Tsuneo.....	Commander.....	" " " " " "
TOIBATA, Kurie.....	Commander.....	" " " " " "
FUJII, Shigeru.....	Commander.....	Private Secretary to Navy Minister (Admiral SHIMADA, Shigetaro).
N-TEAM.		
COMBINED FLEET:		
YAMAMOTO, Isoroku.....	Admiral.....	CinC Combined Fleet.
ITO, Seichi.....	Rear Admiral.....	Chief of Staff.
KUROJIMA, Kameto.....	Captain.....	Deputy Chief of Staff.
GOTO, Shigeru.....	Commander.....	Staff Adjutant.
ISOBE, Taro.....	Commander.....	Staff Engineering Officer.
SUGI, Toma.....	Commander.....	Staff Gunnery Officer.
SASAKI, Akira.....	Commander.....	Staff Air Officer.
WADA, Yushiro.....	Commander.....	Staff Communication Officer.
NAGATA, Shigeru.....	Commander.....	Staff Navigation Officer.
WATANABE, Yasuji.....	Commander.....	Staff Operations and Plans Officer.
ARIMA, Takayasu.....	Commander.....	Staff Torpedo Officer.
SEIMI, Ichiyoshi.....	Commander.....	Staff Supply Officer.
OTA, Kanai.....	Commander.....	Meteorologist attached to Staff.

	Rank	Official duties
<i>N-TEAM</i> —Continued		
1st COMBINED COMMUNICATIONS UNIT (RADIO INTELLIGENCE):		
KAKIMOTO, Gonichiro.....	Rear Admiral.....	Commander.
ARISAWA, Naosada.....	Commander.....	Deputy Chief of Staff.
<i>E-TEAM:</i>		
SECOND FLEET:		
KONDO, Nobutake.....	Admiral.....	Commander.
[3] YANAGIZAWA, Kuranosuke.....	Captain.....	Deputy Chief of Staff.
OISHI, Tamotsu.....	Commander.....	Staff Navigation Officer.
FOURTH FLEET:		
INOUE, Semi.....	Vice Admiral.....	Commander.
FIFTH FLEET:		
HOSOGAYA, Boshiro.....	Vice Admiral.....	Commander.
ELEVENTH AIR FLEET:		
TSUKAHARA, Nishizo.....	Vice Admiral.....	Commander.
KUSAKA, Jinichi.....	Rear Admiral.....	Chief of Staff.
<i>A-TEAM:</i>		
THIRD FLEET (Amphibious Forces for Southern invasions):		
TAKAHASHI, Ibo.....	Vice Admiral.....	Commander.
ISHIHARA, Hajime.....	Captain.....	Deputy Chief of Staff.
SIXTH FLEET:		
SHIMIZU, Mitsumi.....	Vice Admiral.....	Commander.
KANOAKA, Tomojiro.....	Captain.....	Deputy Chief of Staff.
FIRST AIR FLEET (Carrier Fleet):		
NAGUMO, Chuichi.....	Vice Admiral.....	Commander.
KUSAKA, Ryunosuke.....	Rear Admiral.....	Chief of Staff.
GENDA, Minoru.....	Commander.....	Deputy Chief of Staff.

On 3 September, officers involved studied classified material. POW was assigned to "N" Team (CinC Combined Fleet). The afternoon, Commander WATANABE—Admiral YAMAMOTO's hard-working, fact-finding Plans and Operations Officer—handed the POW an outline of conditions under which the games were to be held, and requested fifty copies. These terms, which set forth a working basis for the games, contained the heart of the forthcoming 1 November OpOrder #1. Extensive preliminary planning was indicated. The prisoner believed that these plans must have been under development for several months. This was the first time that the POW realized that something of unusual significance was in the air.

On 5 September, the POW was attached directly to Commander SASAKI, CinC Combined Fleet's Staff Air Officer. When he entered the smoked-filled room at about 1000, he found PEARL HARBOR plans under discussion. The Japs apparently expected to catch all major U. S. Fleet units in the Pacific in PEARL HARBOR as well as units believed recently transferred from the Atlantic. The prisoner was surprised to overhear that "N" Team expected to lose one-third of the units participating in the attack on HAWAII; one AKAGI Class CV and one SORYU Class CV were estimated as [1/4] sunk.

On 6 or 7 September, the conference of "N" Team debated the best means of assaulting PEARL HARBOR. (The POW, who was adept at the abacus—calculating board—was often used during these sessions to estimate fuel used by Fleet units at varying speeds). It was during this stage of planning that Captain KUROJIMA (Deputy Chief of Staff) and Rear Admiral ITO (Chief of Staff) differed as to the practicability of conducting an amphibious assault on HAWAII. The cool and precise ITO was (surprisingly) in favor of an early landing, and YAMAMOTO was inclined to agree, but the intuitive, temperamental KUROJIMA won the discussion by pointing out insuperable logistics problems. The POW believes that ITO's plan was a last-minute, improvised idea, and that—when KUROJIMA's argument succeeded—the basic plan continued as originally intended.

These early sessions, the POW said, seemed confined primarily to two general problems: first, the details for a successful surprise raid on PEARL HARBOR; and second, a carefully worked-out schedule for occupying MALAYA, BURMA, D. E. I., the PHILIPPINES, the SOLOMONS, and Central Pacific Islands—including (ultimately) HAWAII. Neither AUSTRALIA nor NEW ZEALAND was apparently considered as immediate military objectives; the Japs intended simply to cut them off from outside help. The POW heard INDIA mentioned only once, when some senior officer remarked "that's where friction with GERMANY will begin".

The conferences (and "games") were ended about 13 September. The prisoner helped carry the notes to KURE, and thence by launch to the NAGATO. YAMAMOTO's Flagship, which was anchored at HASHIRAJIMA. About half of the Staff were already on board.

On 15 September, all the Staff with four yeomen (not including POW) journeyed to the IWAKUNI Air Group to confer with the Army. The POW remembers TERAUCHI mentioned, but cannot recall other names. He insists, however, that TOJO—then still War Minister—was not present. It was widely rumored (but never confirmed by other evidence) that the Army conferees at this meeting had not previously learned of plans to attack PEARL HARBOR.

The NAGATO remained at HASHIRAJIMA for about six more days. At the end of September, the main body of the Jap Fleet moved to SAEKI. There were four revisions of Combined Fleet OpOrder #1 while the Flagship was at SAEKI, though no major changes were made.

On 1 November, the final printing of the order was started, requiring almost three days to complete. Two copies were sent to the Army. Staff officers of other Fleet units at SAEKI called for copies in person. In all, 300 copies were distributed. Op Orders #2 and #3, designating Y-Day and X-Day, were issued on 5 and 10 November, respectively.

(Comment: The enemy naturally uses East Longitude Time in his OpOrder—i. e., the date of 8 December for the PEARL HARBOR attack is correct E.L.T.)

[5] The prisoner once knew the OpOrder intimately. Over a period of weeks, he has labored to reproduce on paper as much of the Order as he could remember. This version is obviously incomplete and not to be compared with the original document, but in main outline is believed to be substantially as printed. Notes in parentheses were added by the editor.

Flagship NAGATO, SAEKI WAN
1 November 1941

COMBINED FLEET SECRET OPORD #1

The Japanese Empire will declare war on the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS.

War will be declared on X-Day.

This order will become effective on Y-Day.

General Situation

(a) Policy toward the UNITED STATES.

In spite of the fact that the Empire has always maintained a friendly attitude toward the UNITED STATES, the UNITED STATES has interfered in all the measures which we have taken in self protection for the preservation of our interests in East ASIA. Recently, she has blocked our speedy settlement of the CHINA Incident by aiding the government of CHIANG Kai-shek and has even resorted to the final outrage of breaking off economic relations. While senselessly prolonging Japanese-American negotiations, she has continued to strengthen her military preparations. She offers a threat to us in the form of a concentration of her Fleet in the PACIFIC OCEAN, thus attempting to exert on us both economic and military pressure.

(b) Policy toward GREAT BRITAIN.

BRITAIN is aiding the government of CHIANG Kai-shek and, acting in concert with her Allies and the UNITED STATES, in interfering with our program of construction in East ASIA. Recently she has been steadily building up the defenses of her bases in East ASIA in an attempt to threaten us.

(c) Policy toward the NETHERLANDS INDIES.

Although economic negotiations of a peaceful nature have been underway with us for a number of months, the NETHERLANDS INDIES has been led by BRITAIN and the UNITED STATES to reject flatly the continuance of mutually beneficial economic relations. Recently she has threatened the fortunes of Japanese which have been built up as a result of persevering work through long years.

(d) The ports and the vast fertile regions of the coast of CHINA have been occupied by us and most of her great cities captured. CHINA, however, [6] supported by BRITAIN and the United States, has not yet awakened from the deluding dream of "Fight the War and Save the Country" and is attempting total resistance to Japan in the form of a "scorched earth" policy for all CHINA.

While organized resistance is gradually becoming weaker, the prevalence of guerilla warfare has obliged us to commit large numbers of troops to permanent garrison duty there. If we are to secure decisive victory, BRITAIN and the UNITED STATES, the powers behind CHINA, must be destroyed.

(e) Policy toward the SOVIET UNION.

The strength of Soviet forces on the Soviet-Manchukuoan border is formidable.

The USSR is maintaining a vigilant alert, awaiting developments. However, if the Empire does not attack the SOVIET UNION, it is believed that the SOVIET UNION will not commence hostilities.

Our situation

The Fourth Fleet has largely completed preparation in the Mandated Islands, as has the Eleventh Air Fleet (Naval shore-based air) at essential bases in CHINA, FRENCH INDO-CHINA and THAILAND. The state of repair of our ships and planes is generally excellent and the efficiency of their personnel has markedly improved.

Strategic objectives

To drive BRITAIN and AMERICA from Greater East ASIA, and to hasten the settlement of the CHINA Incident. In addition, it is expected that when BRITAIN and AMERICA have been driven from the NETHERLANDS INDIES and the PHILIPPINES, an independent self-supporting economic entity may be firmly established. The vast and far-reaching fundamental principle, the spiritual guide of our nation, (the "Eight Corners of the World Under One Roof—HAKKO ICHIU), may be demonstrated to the world. To this end we will use all the military strength necessary.

Strategy

The strategy to be adopted against BRITAIN, the UNITED STATES and the NETHERLANDS will be as directed in the Annexed Volume. X-Day and Y-Day will be announced later.

If before Y-Day the enemy is believed to have been able to ascertain our plans, the execution of X-Day will be made the subject of a special order.

If before X-Day we should be attacked by the enemy, his attack will be crushed with all available strength. All commanding officers will act in conformance with "Strategy to be Adopted in the Case of an Enemy Attack".

In the case of the SOVIET UNION, every effort will be made to avoid provoking hostilities. At the same time, every effort will be made to insure the secrecy [7] of our plans. If the enemy should ascertain our plans, military operations will immediately be begun in accordance with "Measures to be Taken in the Case of an Attack by the SOVIET UNION".

Circulation of this order is limited to Fleet and Force Commanders. These Commanders will take every possible measure to prevent leakage of these plans prior to their being carried out.

Precaution: Disposal of this order.

This order must be burned when no longer of use. If there is any danger of its falling into enemy hands as the result of a ship sinking or some other untoward occurrence, the responsible Commander shall personally make immediate disposal of it.

Combined Fleet SECRET OpOrd #1

ANNEXED VOLUME

1. Joint Army-Navy operations will be carried out in accordance with the "Army-Navy Central Headquarters Agreement".

2. A Striking Force (Carrier Task Force), having the 1st Air Fleet (Carriers and Escorts) as its main element, will depart its naval bases or operating areas about X-16 Day, and will set course, by way of TANKAN BAY (HITO-KAPPU BAY, ETOROFU ISLAND, KURILES) for PEARL HARBOR, the base of the American PACIFIC Fleet, where it will deliver a surprise attack.

X-Day is expected to be during the early or middle part of December.

3. Targets for attack are airfields, aircraft carriers; battleships, cruisers and other warships; merchant shipping; port facilities; and land installations, in that order.

4. From the time set by the Force Commander for the Striking Force to leave port in JAPAN, strict radio silence will be observed. Communications will be

via ordinary broadcast system. The code book to be used will be "(not certain)". The following communications abbreviations will be in effect:

"Many warships in PEARL HARBOR_	"The fate of the Empire".
"No warships in PEARL HARBOR_-----	"The cherry-blossoms are in all their glory".
"The weather is clear and visibility good in the region. Suitable for an attack".	"Climb MT FUJI".
"The time to commence the attack is 0520.	"The depth of the moat of HONNOJI Temple is 0520".
"All forces attack"-----	"Climb MT NIITAKA!".
etc.	

[8] 5. The course and the disposition of the attacking units will be determined by the Striking Force commander.

The Commander of the Striking Force will inform the proper authorities as soon as he determines on the course and disposition of the attacking units. Care must be taken to avoid ordinary merchant shipping routes and to keep the plans from disclosure under any circumstances whatever.

6. Procedure to be followed in case of discovery before the attack either by a ship of the nation against which war is to be declared, or by a ship of a neutral nation (including the SOVIET UNION).

(a) In case of discovery within 600 miles of the objective by a ship of a nation against which war is to be declared, make immediate preparation to attack and sink it.

(b) In case of discovery within 600 miles of the objective by a ship of a neutral nation, the ship should immediately be detained until it can do us no actual harm; strict surveillance should be kept of its radio transmission. In case it should make any transmissions which might prove harmful to us or give us reason to fear that our plans might be revealed, the ship will be seized by a destroyer which will make immediate attack preparations.

(c) In case of discovery by a foreign ship more than 600 miles from the objective, the ship will be detained and radio transmission forbidden. However, if it seems highly probable that our general intentions have been guessed, an attack should be made immediately, if between X-5 Day and X-Day. If before X-5 Day, the Striking Force commander will decide the disposition of the ship, depending on the circumstances. In the case of detention of an enemy ship, "B" method will be followed.

7. The Commander of the Surprise Attack Force (Submarine Force), having the 6th Fleet (Submarine Fleet) as its main element, will have most of the submarines leave the western part of the INLAND SEA on X-20 Day to attack PEARL HARBOR. Its entire strength will be disposed so as to command the harbor mouth. It will attack any enemy warship which may have escaped from the harbor. It will also carry out reconnaissance before the attack, and if the opportunity presents itself, will carry out surprise attacks on enemy warships with midget submarines. The time for such attacks will be after the flights of planes have attacked OAHU. Every possible means for recovery of midget submarines should be considered.

8. Joint Army-Navy operations should be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the Central Headquarters Agreement. The disposition of forces will be determined by the Commander of the Advance Force (principally Second Fleet cruisers and destroyers). The Commander of the Advance Force will inform the proper authorities as soon as he decides on the course and disposition of the attacking units.

The point of departure for the ships of the MALAY and FRENCH INDO-CHINA Forces will be BAKO and the point of departure for the PHILIPPINES Occupa- [9] tion Forces will probably be PALAU.

9. The capture of English and American troops and ships in CHINA will be arranged by the Commander-in-Chief of the CHINA Area Fleet. The occupation of HONG KONG will conform to the provisions of the Army-Navy Central Headquarters Agreement and the responsibility of the Commander, 2nd CHINA Expeditionary Fleet.

10. English and American merchant ships which are in ports under Japanese sovereignty at the time of the outbreak of the war or which are in ports which may be taken are to be captured if possible.

SOVIET shipping is to be kept under surveillance after undergoing a rigid inspection.

It should be so planned that none of our shipping will be in foreign ports when the war breaks out.

11. Beginning on Y-Day the Commander of the 1st Combined Communication Unit will send false messages to give the impression that the main strength of the fleet is in the western part of the INLAND SEA.

After Y-Day has been determined, the NYK passenger vessel TATSUTA MARU, which is scheduled to proceed to the west coast of AMERICA, will sail; arrangements will be made to have her return while en route. (This was done, and Allied passengers were interned; the same procedure would have been followed with any trans-Pacific liner scheduled to sail in this period).

When Y-Day has been determined, the Commandant of the YOKOSUKA Naval District will allow as many men of his command as possible to go ashore so that the number of men on liberty in TOKYO and YOKOHAMA will give a false impression. (Another POW confirms this).

12. The Commander-in-Chief of the 4th Fleet (Mandates Fleet) will expedite the attack and occupation of British, American and Dutch bases in the North and South PACIFIC, acting in close cooperation with forces of the 11 Air Fleet in the South PACIFIC. Enemy air power within our sphere of operations will be checked and communication between AUSTRALIA and the mainland of the UNITED STATES will finally be cut.

It is expected that in this manner AUSTRALIA will be isolated and dominated completely. The natural resources of all kinds which the vast continent of AUSTRALIA boasts will then fall to us.

(The dates for execution of assault and occupation of various British, U. S., Netherlands bases were then listed in this paragraph—a few of which follow:)

(1) GUAM

(2) WAKE

about X plus 2.

about X plus 7.

[10] (3) (The dates for the invasions of RABAU and the islands from the SOLOMONS to the FIJIS, SAMO, and SANTA CRUZ groups were all entered.)

13. The date for the seizure of MIDWAY is set as late Spring of 1942. The date for the occupation of the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS is scheduled for October 1942.

Herewith are two of the above referenced documents

THE ARMY-NAVY CENTRAL HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT

The object of Imperial Headquarters, Army Department and Imperial Headquarters, Navy Department in setting forth clearly the division of duties and command in joint operations was to promote a maximum display of efficiency. (According to POW, it was issued at the end of October 1941. A resume of the contents follows:)

1. The highest ranking Army officer for SUMATRA, BORNEO, the MALAY Peninsula, CELEBES, and the PHILLIPINES (including FRENCH INDO-CHINA and THAILAND) will be Field Marshal TERAUCHI, Hisaichi. His command will be called the Southern Army and its headquarters will be in SAIGON.

2. Plans for escorting large Army convoys and the place, time and date for landings.

3. Agreements on Aerial Warfare Agreements on the places to be attacked by both Army and Navy planes and on the places, dates and times of attacks by Army or Navy planes acting independently. Agreements on the airfields to be used, such as "XX Airfield will be used primarily by the Army and secondarily by the Navy."

4. Supply Plans.

Plans for the supply of Army landing forces to be effected by Army shipping and for the Navy's support of same.

5. Communications Plans.

6. Agreement on occupied territories, cities, and resources such as, "The BANDJERMASIN Oil Refinery will be controlled by the Navy".

MEASURES TO BE TAKEN IN CASE OF A SOVIET ATTACK

(POW does not remember the date exactly, but it was the end of October—and stated in effect:)

"It is believed likely that we shall not be attacked by the SOVIET UNION unless we attack first, but in case JAPAN is attacked first, the 5th Fleet (Northern Force) will counterattack with all its strength and maintain local supremacy."

YAMAMOTO, Isoroku,
Commanding, Combined Fleet.

[11]

Flagship AKAGI, SAEKI WAN
10 November 1941

STRIKING FORCE OPORD #1

1. All ships will complete battle preparations by 20 November.
2. The fleet will rendezvous at TANKAN WAN. (HITOKAPPU BAY, ETO-ROFU Is. KURILES).

3. Inasmuch as the plans for the coming operation must be kept absolutely secret, strict security will be maintained in regard to them, up to the time they are explained to the crew after port of departure in JAPAN has been cleared.

4. Break-down of attack plane units.

The AKAGI 1st Attack Plane Unit

Unit Commander: Lt. Comdr XX

1st Carrier Attack Unit

Etc. (details not recalled by POW).

5. Fleet cruising formation

(Including retiring formations)

6. All transmission of messages is strictly forbidden.

Transmission and reception will both use the TOKYO #1 broadcast communications system.

NAGUMO Chuichi,
Commanding Striking Force.

Verbal explanation by the Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet of ambiguities in Combined Fleet SECRET OpOrd #1.

(Printed version of an explanation of details not covered in the order delivered to the High Commanders in an informal talk.)

1. The the coming declaration of war against ENGLAND and the UNITED STATES will usher in a great war survival with the two leading naval powers of the world.

That this war is really one in which our existence is in question, one in which we have no choice but to strike with our military power.

2. That our Navy, in engaging a worthy enemy, is about to realize an ambition which dates back to the foundation of the Imperial Navy many years ago.

[12] 3. That the alliance with GERMANY was not desired by the Navy, but was a project favored by the Army which thought it would hold the SOVIET UNION in check. (!)

4. That the campaigns in the NETHERLAND INDIES and in the PHILIPPINES will be preceded by the securing of advanced bases in THAILAND and French INDO-CHINA. It is believed that these operations will come off in extremely smooth order.

The Navy will be able to secure sources of oil supply swiftly by means of these campaigns.

5. In connection with the attack on PEARL HARBOR, reports indicate that a gigantic fleet, which includes the ATLANTIC Fleet, has massed in PEARL HARBOR.

This Fleet will be utterly crushed with one blow at the very beginning of hostilities. It is planned to shift the balance of power and thereby confuse the enemy at the outset and deprive him of his fighting spirit.

Our objective, however, lies more than three thousand miles away. In attacking this large fleet concentration it is to be expected that countless difficulties will be encountered in preserving the absolute security of the plans. If these plans should fail at any stage, our Navy will suffer the wretched fate of never

being able to rise again. The success of our surprise attack on PEARL HARBOR will prove to be the "WATERLOO" of the war to follow. For this reason the Imperial Navy is massing the cream of its strength in ships and planes to assure success.

All of the planes of CarDiv 1, CarDiv 2, and CarDiv 5 will be concentrated in the attack on OAHU. If there are any ships which escape, almost the entire submarine strength of the 6th Fleet will be in command of the harbor mouth and will concentrate torpedo attacks on them. In addition to these, the destroyer strength of (DesRon 1) will be deployed in a screen (mainly for night attacks) and the fast battleships of BatDiv 3 deployed in a fourth echelon. If the main force of the enemy fleet should escape from PEARL HARBOR and make for the open sea, it will be waylaid by the Main Body of our fleet.

6. The midget submarine unit has been studying and training at the KURE Navy Yard with the CHIYODA for a year and a half, but it is still too much to hope that it has reached a stage of perfection. In any case, the crew members are supremely confident. The 6th Fleet will attempt to use them in attacks within the harbor.

7. It is clear that even if AMERICA's enormous heavy industry productive power is immediately converted to the manufacture of ships, planes and other war materials, it will take at least several months [13] for her manpower to be mobilized against us. If we insure our strategic supremacy at the very outset of the conflict by attacking and seizing all key points at one blow while AMERICA is still unprepared, we can swing the scales of later operations in our favor.

8. Heaven will bear witness to the righteousness of our struggle. It is hoped that every man will exert his full efforts toward the realization of the objectives of this holy war by determinedly carrying out our original purpose, in the full realization of the unparalleled opportunity which this war offers.

Communications Plans. (POW does not know about these; no details.)

Supply Plans. (outline)

The Naval bases of YOKOSUKA, KURE and SASEBO will be rear supply bases. BAKO, PALAU, TRUK and OMINATO will be forward supply bases. In addition to these, supply ships will be attached to each fleet.

5 November

Combined Fleet SECRET OpOrd #2
Y-Day will be 23 November.

10 November

Combined Fleet SECRET OpOrd #3
X-Day will be 8 December.

During the actual attack on PEARL HARBOR, the prisoner remained aboard the NAGATO in the Empire with the Flag of CinC Combined Fleet. Detailed of the Carrier Task Force which conducted the raid are known from other prisoners and from documents. See, for example, the chart of 1st Air Fleet movements as reproduced elsewhere in this issue.

The TF sortied from ETOROFU TO, in the KURILES, on or about 27 November (ELT), and headed eastward under a heavy front before turning south to the attack. The composition of the Force, which was commanded by the late Vice Admiral NAGUMO (CinC 1st Air Fleet) is fairly well established. The enemy had six carriers: KAGA, AKAGI (CarDiv 1) SORYU, HIRYU (CarDiv 2) SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU (CarDiv 5 less HOSHIO); two BBs: HIYEI, KIRISHIMA (BatDiv 3, less KONGO and HARUNA); three cruisers: TONE, CHIKUMA (CruDiv 8), plus AKUKUMA; elements of DesRon 1; and about twenty subs.

[14] (Comment: It is of interest to note that all six carriers and both battleships participating are now identified as sunk, plus the CA CHIKUMA; the majority of other units involved are also believed sunk or severely damaged, although definite identification is not yet possible.)

One of the Japs' chief headaches during the sorties was the fueling problem. One well informed prisoner who was a CPO on fueling detail described emergency measures required to keep the speedy SORYU and HIRYU in fuel.

These two ships were fueled daily, and drums carried as supercargo were unloaded by bucket-brigade when the fast dash to the plane-launching point was begun. At that, the SORYU arrived back at KURE with only 95 tons of oil in her tanks. AOs coming alongside the TF to fuel units had considerable trouble, and visibility was so bad that "towing spars" for position keeping were almost constantly in use.

At the time of the raid, considerable information was derived from documents taken from crashed planes and a beached midget sub.

Reproduced on the following page is a proposed track chart of a midget sub which had planned to transit PEARL HARBOR but apparently failed. This sub beached itself the following day on the opposite side of OAHU, and one of the two crew members was taken prisoner. Little was learned from the POW, but it is believed that the sub was damaged on a reef near the entrance of PEARL HARBOR, putting sound gear out of commission and forcing retirement. Subsequent examination of this sub's torpedo tubes indicated that an attempt had been made to fire torpedoes, but launching gear fouled.

The original chart, too frayed for reproduction, was evidently a U. S. Navy H. O. chart, with detailed navigational data carefully translated into Japanese. Rough notes were scribbled on the chart, in some cases too illegible to translate. On the reverse side were further notes on navigation, etc. The sub also carried a rough profile of the PEARL HARBOR skyline. The mission of the sub was both attack and reconnaissance. The KANA code as shown on the chart is similar to codes recovered from aircraft.

At least three Jap midget subs were lost by our counter-actions at this time. One sub actually entered the harbor; it suffered a direct five-inch shell hit, and was thereafter rammed and depth charged beyond recognition. The Japs admitted the loss of five of these undersize subs.

(At this point in Exhibit No. 3 there appear eleven items, as follow :

1. Photograph of a Midget Submarine beached on Oahu.
2. Track Chart of Midget Submarine for Transit of Pearl Harbor.
3. Captured Track Chart of Japanese Carriers, covering the period from Pearl Harbor to Midway.
4. Chart reflecting translation of code tables carried by Japanese planes.
5. Photostatic copy of a document from a crashed Japanese plane obtained after the Pearl Harbor raid.
6. Captured chart [fragmentary] employed by Japanese Pearl Harbor raiders giving name, frequency, time of transmission and signal strength of two Honolulu radio stations.
7. Chart of torpedo runs, received from crashed Japanese plane.
8. Captured Japanese photograph of Ford Island under attack on 7 December 1941.
9. Photograph of vessels in the harbor bearing caption in Japanese "the pitiful American Capital Fleet".
10. Photograph showing Wheeler Field during the raid.
11. Chart captioned "Submarine Situation, Nov. 28-Dec. 4".

The foregoing materials will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 1 through 11, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[24] JAP SHIPS SUNK IN MANILA HARBOR, THROUGH 14 NOVEMBER 1944

(At this point in Exhibit No. 3 there appears a sketch showing the approximate location of Japanese ships sunk in Manila Harbor through 14 November 1944. This sketch will be found reproduced as Item No. 12, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

It is estimated that more than 160,000 gross tons of Japanese merchant shipping have been sunk in MANILA Harbor as a result of air attacks by the Third Fleet. This estimated tonnage refers only to MANILA Harbor proper and does not include tonnage sunk in adjacent areas.

The 31 merchant ships noted to have been sunk consisted of two tankers, four of the new 6500 gross ton engine-aft cargo ships (see "Weekly Intelligence", Vol. 1, No. 21), and 25 freighters or freighter-transporters ranging from 2000 to 9000 gross tons. *Ships of less than 1800 gross tons were not considered in the above estimate.*

In addition to the above merchant ships, two warships were sunk in MANILA Harbor and have been identified as a light cruiser of the KUMA class and a destroyer of either the TAKANAMI or new KIYOSHIMA Classes.

The sketch on the opposite page shows the approximate locations of the sunken ships, the names if identified, the tonnage and type. The symbol used to mark the location of each sunken ship also indicates the date of the photograph in which the ship was first observed to have been sunk.

Of particular interest in MANILA Harbor is a ship of the HOEISAN Maru Class, indicated by an arrow. The ship has a minimum of 10 gun positions and extra deck houses. The excessive AA plus the fact that the ship has remained in the same position throughout all photographic coverages suggest that it may be a flak ship.

(At this point in Exhibit No. 3 there appear three items, as follow :

1. Photograph of Manila Harbor.
2. Photographs showing [a] results of Third Fleet Aircraft strike on Manila Harbor 11-14 November and [b] two freighters on the bottom near the breakwater, Manila Harbor.
3. Photographs showing [a] burning ships and shore installations at Manila Harbor and [b] Pier Seven and other installations, Manila Harbor, showing damage from Third Fleet Bombs, 11-14 November 1944.

The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 13, 14, and 15, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[28]

PROBABLE CONVERSION OF JAP HOSPITAL SHIP

Photographed below in MANILA on 21 September is a ship apparently identical to BAIKAL MARU, an AH. Still officially listed as a hospital ship, this vessel has no known sister ship. It was not painted with the prescribed markings for hospital ships and has apparently been reconverted to a merchantman to ease the current severe Jap shipping shortage. Two gun platforms are noted forward and one aft.

Although positive identification of this vessel as the BAIKAL MARU must await further confirmation, it is logical to expect the enemy to reconvert his AHs for more practical if less humane purposes. More than 20 sizeable Japanese vessels are still officially on the books as hospital ships—a disproportionate allotment in view of his general shipping situation.

(The photograph mentioned in the foregoing paragraphs, being of ships at Manila with arrow pointing to a ship apparently identical with *Baikal Maru*, will be found reproduced as Item No. 16, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[29]

INCREASED AA ARMAMENT ON JAP FREIGHTER-TRANSPORT

(The photograph mentioned in the following paragraph, being of a Japanese freighter-transport in ORMOC Bay, will be found reproduced as Item No. 17, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

Photographed by planes of the 13th Bomb Command on 11 November in ORMOC Bay, the Japanese freighter-transport seen above is more heavily armed with AA than any other ship of this type previously observed.

The unusually large AA platform in the bow mounts four three-inch AA guns. In addition, there is one 25-mm in the gun tub forward, and six additional light AA—probably single-mount 25-mm mounted three on each end of the bridge. This armament is in sharp contrast to the standard one or two AA guns usually observed on such vessels.

The enemy may be expected to holster his AA defense aboard all types of merchantmen when armament is available, in a further move to counter increasingly heavy Allied shipping strikes.

(At this point in Exhibit No. 3 there appears a photograph of Manila Harbor and environs taken from the *USS Hancock*. This photograph will be found reproduced as Item No. 18, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[32]

KUMA-NATORI CLASS CL

(The sketch showing the drawings mentioned in the following paragraphs and bearing caption "KUMA-NATORI CL; Estimate of Revised Armament" will be found reproduced as Item No. 19, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

Effectiveness of Allied aircraft against Jap warships has prompted a continuous increase in AA armament. Recent photographs of KUMA-NATORI Class light cruisers offer added documentation of this trend.

On the facing page are reproduced revised measured drawings. The refitted cruisers are now believed armed as follows:

Two 5-inch AA in twin shielded mounts (these replace the No. 7 5.5-inch guns of the original armament).

Five 5.5-inch guns of the original armaments.

Four 25-mm single mount guns.

Ten 25-mm in dual mounts

Three 25-mm in a triple mount.

Two 13-mm in a dual mount.

Available photographs do not offer a clear view of the well aft of the bridge, and it is not possible to determine whether the two twin torpedo tubes mounted there have been removed to make room for additional AA. Although possible, this change is believed unlikely.

The catapult and the crane on the mainmast have been removed. A raised AA platform now occupying the former catapult base is believed to contain a triple-mount AA gun.

The old 5.5-inch No. 5 gun has been removed, and twin 25-mm added on each side of its former location.

A launch and whaleboat are now carried athwartship of the No. 1 and 2 stacks.

LONG DELAY BOMB FUSE

A captured document, (CINCPAC-CINCPA Item No. 8309) disclosed that the Japanese have developed a new long delay bomb fuse. It is designated as Experimental Type 1 Special Nose Fuse, and is to be used in the Model 3 No. 6 Mark 23 bomb, Model 1. This bomb is the Japanese 132-lb. delay-type generally used against airfields.

Nothing is known of the time delay incorporated in this new fuse, but the only other Japanese time delay fuse known has three settings, 5, 36 or 72 hours. In construction this new fuse is an improvement over the old one.

ERRATUM: In "Weekly Intelligence", Vol. 1, No. 17, it was erroneously stated both in the text and on the charts of the Second Battle of the PHILIPPINES Sea that Third Fleet BBs sank a crippled cruiser on the afternoon of 25 October. Actually, U. S. light cruisers sank this Jap warship.

[34]

FLOATING MINES IN THE JAPAN SEA

Data on the chart on the opposite page was taken from a recently recovered enemy document (CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item No. 12,410). Although dated well over a year ago, the information plotted offers a revealing glimpse of the extensive Japanese mining activity in the strategic waters of the JAPAN Sea. Floating mines reported to Jap hydrographers along the southwest coast of HONSHU were very possibly brought north by ocean currents from the heavily-mined CHOSEN Strait. The cluster of mines reported south of VLADIVOSTOK reflects the use of mines by RUSSIA to protect her greatest Pacific port area. The total number of mines reported during the brief two-month period indicates one of the strongest threats to U. S. subs operating in these Jap-controlled waters.

(The chart mentioned in the foregoing paragraph, being of floating mines in Japan Sea Area, March 1943 to May 1943, will be found reproduced as Item No. 20, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

NEW JAP RIFLE GRENADE

(A photograph of the new Japanese rifle grenade, mentioned in the following paragraph, will be found reproduced as Item No. 21, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

A new type of Japanese High explosive rifle grenade, embodying several features not previously encountered, was captured during a recent operation. This grenade is designed to be fired by a wooden bullet from the Type 38 and Type 99 rifles. Since these rifles are standard combat issue, it is believed this grenade was produced for universal use.

Carrying a main charge of three ounces of cast TNT and an instantaneous fuse this grenade has four fins of light metal attached to the stabilizer to guide it in flight.

Upon impact, an inertia block is forced into the fuse body, breaking a brass shear wire and driving the steel striker into the percussion cap. The cap ignites a black powder relay which sets off a cyclonite primer. Then, in succession, the tetryl booster and the main TNT charge are ignited.

The heavy construction of the inertia weight shear pin indicates that contact with a soft object might not be sufficient to fire the fuse. However, a notation attached to the captured grenade warns against dropping or striking the nose of the projectile. A safety fork, which must be removed before firing, supposedly prevents accidental detonation.

A complete round of this new grenade has been examined by Mobile Explosives Investigation Unit #4, but its effectiveness has not been determined. The explosive charge was reported comparable to the KISKA-type hand grenade.

(At this point in Exhibit No. 3 there appear photographs of a *Genyo* Class Tanker, the victim of a PB4Y. These photographs will be found reproduced as Item No. 22, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[37]

JAP AERIAL ANTI-SUB DOCTRINE

A detailed explanation of the Japanese Navy's aerial anti-submarine doctrine is contained in an unusually lucid and analytical captured document.

This document was somewhat mutilated and its date of publication and issuing authority are missing. Its relatively recent origin, however, is established by the fact that episodes as late as February 1944 are mentioned, and the general tone indicates that it may be one of the series of tactical research studies published by the authoritative YOKOSUKA Naval Air Group.

Of special interest are notations referring to the use of radar and magnetic detectors. The tactical doctrine for these devices appears to be still in a state of development, but their use may be expected to grow. Previous documentary evidence has established the installation of magnetic detectors on JAKEs early last summer and it is probable that other planes may be so equipped now.

The document, which will be published in full as (CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item No. 9979), shows a full appreciation of the alertness and perseverance necessary in effective aerial anti-submarine warfare. It contains many combat examples which are not reproduced in this article.

Aerial anti-sub tactics, says the document in its introduction, must be based on the rapid employment of large numbers of aircraft, even if it is necessary to make some sacrifice in quality.

"The commanding officer must stand at the head of his troops", it states.

"The present combat conditions, if compared to land warfare, represent not a battle of confrontation with the commander back of the center, but a final charge led by the commander. In forces having detachments, the commander should shift frequently to the various detachments, and direct activities on the spot.

"Patrol duty requires especial attention to promotion of morale because of the tediousness of the topography. A patrol which has been lacking in alertness is nothing but throwing away fuel."

Aggressiveness is stressed. *

"It is necessary to attach importance to persistent and thorough sweep attacks. If we concentrate on defense alone in combat, the enemy gradually counters with increased threats. When we strike a strong blow against them, they immediately cease their pressure. This is shown by the fact that after the CAMRANH Bay Force (BUTAI), KUSHIMOTO Force (BUTAI), and TATEYAMA Air Group YAMADA Detachment had achieved considerable success in combat, the enemy subs in that area lay low for a while."

Patience and imagination are essential.

"Even though our efforts are not rewarded and success in battle is not attained, [38] we must not become impatient and do anything rash.

"Such things as new tactics should be tried out as much as conditions permit. In anti-submarine patrol nothing as yet exists which can be called fixed rules. This is especially true under conditions where definite superiority cannot be determined."

In regard to night operations.

"Night training in many cases is not carried out due to the pressure of work or liberty or the like. However, there is great need for an increase of ability in night operations, and it is essential to carry this out strictly because of its special need in reference to the use of radar."

Lack of proper preparation may spoil an attack.

"In the fall of 1943 the CHUYO, about 300 nautical miles southeast of SUNOSAKI was hit by a torpedo and sank, but a medium attack plane of the TATEYAMA Air Group patrolling in the area immediately after this sighted a surfaced enemy submarine and headed for it. The plane was shortly picked up by the radar and when it reached the spot, only the wake was to be seen. A bombing attack was made and the first bomb fell with a right-left deviation of 0, seventy meters ahead of the target, but the second bomb of the run did not drop because of failure of the release. Although they attacked again after repairing this, the bomb fell short and no results were obtained. If the second bomb had dropped on the first run, success would have been assured, but because of poor preparations the opportunity was missed and they could get no revenge."

Planes must be ready for instant operations.

"It is necessary to send out attack units immediately after receiving warning reports. The sea area requiring patrol increases proportionately to the square of the time elapsed from the sighting of the enemy to the arrival on the scene of the attack units. However, since the arrival on the spot of attacking vessels is usually markedly late, it is essential that the air forces consider this matter so as to remedy the deficiency."

Bad weather must be turned to account.

"At such times there are chances for catching the enemy. When the visibility on the surface is bad, it is generally the plane that makes the sighting before the submarine does. Instrument flying training should be carried out so that it is at least possible to fly with safety in bad weather. If necessary it should be carried out while on patrol at times when vigilance may be relaxed, even if it means sacrificing observation by the pilot. However, assigning unreasonable operations to untrained personnel and suffering useless losses is condemned. Hence, in weather in which the ability of the flying crew is not to be trusted, it is best to return to base without loss of time."

U. S. submarine tactics.

"By always carefully observing the condition of the enemy and knowing his [39] present tactics, strike the first blow, and realizing that the tactics in present use will finally become historical old tactics, prepare for future combat."

"At present the enemy makes the utmost use of radar and sonar to catch his prey, and then carries out accurate firing by exposing the periscope. However, a shift to completely submerged firing is being planned for the near future. Counter-measures must be studied.

"Surface submarines sometimes use camouflage and deceptive measures. When a strange boat has been sighted, she must be reconnoitered in detail. These subs change their appearance to that of a fishing boat by the use of sails or nets, or put up false smokestacks, and the like, and disguise themselves as boats of other types.

Tactics for anti-sub patrol.

"When there are large and small planes at the same base, the large planes will chiefly carry out day and night long range patrols around convoy routes and make it impossible for enemy submarines to operate on the surface. In addition to making it difficult for them to approach our strategic places and convoys, these planes will carry out surprise attacks, taking advantage of the relaxing of the enemy's guard. The small type planes will have as their chief duty the thorough patrolling of areas near strategic points and direct escort of convoys. The large type planes, even though slow of movement, can still obtain favorable combat results.

"Patrol must be maintained day and night with as many planes as possible.

"Continuous neutralizing sweeps only show results when there is no let-up during the night. No matter how severely subs may be suppressed during the day, if there are weak points at night it is very easy for enemy subs to flee on the surface."

Tactics for planes directly escorting convoys.

"When direct escort planes sight torpedoes, they will bomb the spot from which the torpedo tracks originate and strafe the torpedoes. Depending on conditions (distance from the ships, number of bombs carried, etc.), the torpedoes may be bombed and a report of this made to the unit under direct escort (escorting vessels).

Patrol altitudes and security.

"Determine the altitude, considering foremost ease in sighting, and secondarily the ease of carrying out bomb and/the possibility of/complications.

"(1) When primarily for visual contact.

"a. Usually 400-800 meters will be suitable.

"b. In darkness it is best/to fly at/about 200 meters.

"c. For confirming/sightings, etc./it is best to fly at about 300 meters.

"(2) When using magnetic detector.

"Daytime—under 80 meters is best.

[40] "Night time—80-100 meters is best.

"When an important escort convoy is passing it is necessary to report its

movements to the forces responsible for the next sector and make sure that there are no gaps in the escort protection.

"In carrying this out, care must be taken that the enemy is not informed of the movements of the convoy.

The lookout.

"The first step which determines the success or failure of attacks on enemy subs is the lookout.

"It is necessary that before boarding/the plane/the sectors of responsibility be determined, and that there be the will to sight the enemy without fail within the field of visibility by an alert lookout at all times.

"Enemy submarines do not give up just because of the presence of a plane overhead. If there is neglect in the lookout, aimless flying or the like, serious result will certainly follow. In all the combat examples relating to the sighting of enemy submarines, one cannot but wonder whether the flight crews put forth serious efforts.

"It is necessary to maintain a strict visual lookout even when using radar, magnetic detectors and the like.

"The magnetic detector is employed especially in cases when the potential submarine area is small, as in the early stages after a sighting, and the like, and the radar is employed especially at night in search of surface enemy submarines.

"When it is feared that an enemy submarine has gotten away, it is necessary to intensify direct escort in the area in which it is most probable that the sub is operating or lying submerged, and the area must also be swept. Generally when patrol, direct escort, and attack are incompatible, put emphasis on the attack; and when afraid the enemy has been lost, the emphasis must be shifted to direct escort without loss of time.

Principles of the attack.

"When an enemy sub has been sighted, take care that it is not bombed inaccurately in confusion, and make it a principle not to have to make a second try. When the aim is found correct, all bombs must be dropped in one pass. If they are not, the second attack generally has lost its target due to the sub's diving or there may be no results on single dropping due to fuse failure. When it is clearly recognized that there has been no result, a second attack must be planned.

"However, if circumstances warrant, it may be all right to drop single bombs as signals.

"The results of submarine attacks, even when the bomb lands well, being uncertain [41] due to frequently having a bad underwater trajectory or exploding at the wrong depth, it is necessary to attack with as many bombs as possible. The underwater trajectory of a bomb is generally uniform to a depth of about 20 meters, but beyond that varies greatly. When there is any suspicion of an enemy sub, unless there is fear of attacking friendly forces, attack and do not spare the bombs.

"Intimidation attacks should be made when the positional error of the enemy sub is within 6000 meters and there is necessity for preventing its raising its periscope and making another attack.

Guiding other planes to the attack.

"The plane which has sighted an enemy submarine will drop target marker bombs so that it does not lose track of it, and guiding other planes by radio, it points the direction of the enemy sub with a small blue flag after bringing them to the position of the enemy sub. Moreover, if necessary, it drops more target marker bombs and carries out bombing operations. It flies, banking toward the true bearing of the enemy sub's position from the bombing splashes and target markers, or reports the bearing and distance by radio.

"The planes being guided will focus their attention on the direction indicated. When the position of enemy sighting or the point of the said direction and distance is an unknown distance, they will bomb a point 50 meters in that direction. If the planes being led do know the position of the enemy sub, when necessary they will approach the guide plane, show a small blue flag and bank.

"When two or more planes have gone into bombing runs at the same time, the one having the higher altitude will give way and begin over again. When the altitude is the same, the one having the companion plane on its right will break off and make a second run.

Cooperation of magnetic detector planes.

"To cooperate with magnetic detector planes, the bomber should follow the vectoring bombless plane—but at the same time, the bomber should keep a close visual lookout. (Comment: sic!)

(The sketch appearing at this point in Exhibit No. 3, being a "Method of dropping target bombs," will be found reproduced as Item No. 23, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[42] "When the position of an enemy sub is deduced, drop a smoke bomb as near as possible to that point. Especially are these always to be used when guiding surface craft.

"The attacking planes will watch the above conditions, infer the movements of the enemy, and attack.

Cooperation with surface craft.

"The secret of cooperation is based on mutual understanding. Therefore, we must work for perfection of communications, both visual and wireless, since they are a most important means of establishing understanding.

"In establishing a thorough-going, unobstructed understanding, radio communications must by all means be put to practical use. Even under present conditions, this is never impossible; and, as the actual experience of the YOKOSUKA Air Group clearly shows, if both parties have the proper determination, the desired understanding can be realized.

"Still, when the nature of the present surface craft anti-submarine staff is considered, present development primarily is awaiting vigorous leadership from the aircraft section.

"In directing surface craft, remember that they are often not furnished with sonic gear, that their sighting level is restrictive, and that they are slow. Treat them as if blind.

Ordnance and equipment.

"New weapons should be quickly mastered. Before new equipment is received, as much research as possible should be carried out beforehand. Radar, in particular, has revolutionized warfare, and as it is said of old, 'Without a rifle, no infantry', so without radar, no war planes. In this our country, since it is in the unfortunate position of having started late in this field, requires the utmost endeavor.

"The No. 6 (132 lb.) bomb has little power, and so if it does not hit directly, it can not cause great damage to the enemy. It is best to use the No. 25 (550 lb.) bomb as much as possible.

"The fuse must be set properly. The depth of explosion of anti-submarine bombs is better deeper, rather than shallower than the enemy's depth. Depending on transparency of the water in the patrol area, the type bomb used, and so on, a suitable fuse timing must be used. Usually the first bomb will be set shallow, and the second and succeeding ones should be set for a deep depth to cope with evasive tactics."

(Comment: The Japanese use time rather than hydrostatic fuses for anti-sub bombs.)

"Aggressive use of machine guns must be planned, fitting it to the conditions at the time. Although the results of strafing submarines cannot be expected to be [43] outstanding, by casualties to the officers and other annoyances it can make diving impossible. And it can make the submarine show its position by oil leakage, so the aggressive use of strafing must be kept in mind.

Maintenance.

"The maintenance of aircraft, due to the inadequacies in the supply of matériel, depends in great part on the efforts of the Air Group maintenance crews. For this reason the diligent endeavors of maintenance squad leaders are required.

Confirmation evidence.

"The confirmation of combat results is extremely important for the planning of future attacks.

"Furthermore, since it is not easy because of the peculiar characteristics of submarine and additionally because enemy subs are pulling various sorts of deceptive tricks/confirmation/is becoming more and more difficult.

"Usually, either because the pilot is personally satisfied of the results or

dislikes the trouble of continuing, the attack is broken off prematurely. It is easy to let the enemy slip away in the last five minutes so care is necessary.

"When the following phenomena have been noted, consider the sinking confirmed.

"1. Large amounts of oil leakage and leakage of air bubbles for over 10 minutes, or, although the period of leakage of air is short, when a large amount of air is released due to the damage to the inner shell of the hull.

"2. When oil leakage continues over a fortnight.

"3. When parts which are inside the inner shell of the enemy sub which has been destroyed, come to the surface."

[44]

LONG-SHAFTED ENGINE USED ON JACK

The smoothly streamlined cowlings of the new Jap Navy interceptor, JACK, is made possible by the installation of an unusually constructed engine, the long-shafted Kasei 23.

Information on the appearance of this new powerplant is gained from a recently recovered document (CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item No. 12,608). Data on its performance has appeared in "Weekly Intelligence", Vol. 1, No. 4 and in other publications. Maximum horsepower is 1820 at takeoff.

The extended, Farman-type reduction gearing permits the installation of a highly streamlined cowlings and results in a relatively small frontal area. The cooling problem is overcome by the addition of an auxiliary fan, geared to the propeller shaft and turning in the same direction at an increase ratio of 3.18 to 1.

The Kasei 23 engine is the 20-series parallel of the older Kasei 13, which also has a Farman transmission and is similar in appearance but lacking the fan. The 13 does not appear on any currently operational plane, but served its purpose as an experimental fore-runner of the 23.

The Kasei 23 displays several features of German design influence. The cooling fan is similar to that employed on the FW190; in place of a carburetor, it has a wobble-plate fuel injection system with individual injectors for each of

(The photograph appearing at this point in Exhibit No. 3, being of the Japanese Kasei 23 engine, will be found reproduced as Item No. 24, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

its [45] 14 cylinders, a development similar to that used on the German BMW801. The same device is used on the Ha 112, Model 2 engine installed in DINAH 3.

This type of fuel system plus the fact that the engine uses 91 octane aviation gas as well as water methanol makes its performance different from that of the Kasei 21. The dry weight of the engine, fully equipped, is 1895.95 lbs.

Of special interest is the duraluminum cooling fan which is mounted on a splined sleeve on the propeller shaft. The fan gearing consists of a set of planets mounted on a plate which is splined to the propeller shaft. These planets mesh with a fixed internal spur gear and rotate the sun gear which turns the cooling fan in the same direction as the propeller.

The sun gear rotates on a sleeve around the propeller shaft in a lead-bronze bearing. It is lubricated by oil under pressure from the propeller shaft. This oil is thrown out from the sun gear and lubricates the entire assembly. The propeller shaft has been lengthened 13.78 inches and the extended reduction gear housing is constructed of a lightweight magnesium alloy.

NEW ARMY AIR DIVISION

The existence of an 11th Army Air Division is revealed in a Jap address book taken from an Army twin-engined bomber SALLY shot down over SAIPAN on 3 November (CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item No. 12,300). The location of this unit is given as OSAKA, which is also the headquarters of the Central District Army. This association might indicate that the 11th Air Division has been established to control the air defense of the industrial KOBE-OSAKA-NAGOYA area. The date of organization of the 11th Air Division is not given, although the 10th is known from transfer lists to have been organized in JAPAN last March.

An Air Division in the Japanese Army Air Force is a high tactical and administrative command, subordinate only to an Air Army. The 11th Air Division therefore is presumably subordinate to the 1st Air Army at TOKYO, which is the top Army Air Command for the Empire. An Air Division theoretically commands at least two Air Brigades of three Air Regiments each, or about 200 airplanes. However, in practice the strength of Air Divisions has varied widely.

[46]

JAP AIRFIELD CAMOUFLAGE

Jap use of trees and shrubbery to camouflage planes on the ground is illustrated by photographs of LIPA WEST FIELD on LUZON. Methods used are regarded as fairly successful, since planes are not easily visible from medium altitudes. Note that, contrary to usual Jap practice, netting is not used.

(The photograph appearing at this point in Exhibit No. 3, being of Lipa West Field on Luzon, will be found reproduced as Item No. 25, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

LIPA WEST FIELD's paved runway and trunk taxiways are not successfully toned down and stand out clearly. Smaller loop taxiways, extending 650 yards from the runway, are dirt surfaced and do not stand out as sharply. Revetments, also made of earth, have shrubs growing on them and some have trees within their walls. This prevents sharp contrasts in color or tone in the dispersal areas.

(The photograph appearing at this point in Exhibit No. 3, being also of Lipa West Field on Luzon, will be found reproduced as Item No. 26, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[47] Planes in this and the preceding photo are camouflaged by hiding under trees and by tying palm fronds and other foliage to the wings and fuselage. In most instances the tail assembly of the plane has been placed between two palms and the plane has been pushed under as far as possible. Protruding engines and noses are well covered with foliage. In a few cases one or two palms have been removed, leaving enough space to push the plane clear under cover. Even when this is done, foliage has been thrown over the plane to prevent its disclosure by outline or reflection.

Planes camouflaged in this way are necessarily located within one plane-length of the edge of the taxiway. In some cases, the best indication of a hidden plane is the shadow of revetment walls showing between the trees.

There are no dummy planes on the field, but dud planes are left in plain view even where they partially block taxiways. No damaged planes appear to be camouflaged, but several apparently operational planes are left in treeless areas, both with and without foliage covering.

(Photographs and interpretation by Second Carrier Task Force).

[48]

THUMBNAIL BIOGRAPHIES OF JAPANESE AIRCRAFT

HELEN

(Fourteenth in a series outlining the background of important Japanese Aircraft)

HELEN, the Japanese Army's Type 100 Bomber, has failed to prove in combat the extravagant claims which were made for it at the time of its introduction, but new developments may make it much more formidable.

This aircraft, made by Nakajima, is known to the Japanese as "The Dragon", and was hailed at one time as the plane which would bring the Pacific war to a quick end. However, it has not appeared in substantial quantities and its performance to date has not been outstanding, even though it is among the most heavily armed and armored of Jap bombers.

The original HELEN, Model 1, was powered with 1250 h. p. engines. It was replaced in mid-1943 by a Model 2, with engines of 1450 h. p. Both models are

similar in appearance, being distinguished by a built-up wing section between fuselage and nacelles similar to that of the British Mosquito.

There are indications that a Model 3, equipped with engines of more than 2000 h. p. and with greatly improved performance, is under development, but this version has not been definitely identified.

(The photograph appearing at this point in Exhibit No. 3, being of a heavily camouflaged "Helen," the Japanese Army's Type 100 Bomber, will be found reproduced as Item No. 27, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[49]

PROVISIONAL SKETCH OF GEORGE

Reproduced below are provisionals sketches of GEORGE, new Jap Navy interceptor.

This drawing has been synthesized from documentary evidence, POW statements and sketches, and two rough and incomplete drawings found in a captured mimeographed manual.

No positively identifiable pictures of GEORGE are available, and no specimen has been examined in the field. The accompanying sketch is provisional and will be superseded when better information is at hand.

Characteristics on which available information agrees and which are believed quite reliable include the squarish wing and tail tips, blister canopy, airscoop at five o'clock and large spinner.

Both reported variations of armament and wing position are shown.

(The sketch appearing at this point in Exhibit No. 3, being of George", a new type Japanese Navy interceptor plane, will be found reproduced as Item No. 28, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[50]

SIDELIGHT ON SUICIDES

A JUDY pilot interrogated by Third Fleet after being shot down in an attack off the PHILIPPINES provides a sidelight on the nature of the so-called "KAMIKAZE Special Assault Force" of suicide divers.

This pilot was a member of 502 Naval Air Group, which he said had been joined with several other groups for operations in the PHILIPPINES. His information is open to question, but he appeared reliable on matters which could be checked.

Quoting the interrogation report:

"POW stated that his unit had become a 'suicide' squadron on the 27th of October. The designation as a suicide squad came as a result of the group's commanding officer's request for such designation having been granted by higher authority. The prisoner stated that pilots and other personnel of the group were not questioned as to their desire to become members of a suicide squad.

"He felt that the order to dive on carriers to one's self-destruction was absurd (Bakarashii), but since it was an order he fully intended to carry it out. He did feel that there had been a needless expenditure of life with very little visible success to date. The pilot claimed that he had been given no instruction on the best way to carry out suicidal attacks on carriers; however, he did feel that he would attempt to hit an elevator in that elevators on a carrier were 'weak points'. At the time he left MABALACAT (his base) there were still 50 members of the suicide squadron alive but very few flyable aircraft were available. (Subsequent strikes on LUZON by our carriers may have cut down this number).

"POW was of the opinion that his unit was the only dive-bomber squadron in the Japanese Navy that had been designated as a suicide squadron; however, he felt that in the event of carrier attacks being launched on JAPAN proper, suicidal attacks in large numbers should be anticipated. POW did not believe green and yellow silk flight clothing reported as having been recovered from the body of a Jap pilot who had made a suicide attack on a U. S. carrier had any special significance.

"POW stated that the lack of aviation gasoline had caused the Japs to cut

down on the extent of training, but he had heard of no instances in which offensive missions could not be flown as a result of a lack of AvGas."

POW's belief that his unit was the only one designated as a whole for suicide work coincides with other available evidence. From recent Japanese propaganda broadcasts, it appears that most of the so-called "KAMIKAZE" units are made up more or less extemporaneously of volunteers from various groups acting independently. The "KAMIKAZE" designation appears to be a special mark of distinction applied to any such volunteers, rather than the name of a formal organization.

If true, however, the designation of an entire air group as a suicide unit may mark a significant change in the development of this tactic.

[51]

JAPS DEVELOP INDO-CHINA

The strategic importance of INDO-CHINA to JAPAN has increased as the position of JAPAN in the PHILIPPINES and her supply line to the EAST INDIES have become more precarious. The limited railroad facilities of the country are being utilized to their fullest extent in an endeavor to find safe supply lines. Her ports, particularly SAIGON and CAM RANH BAY are used for the protection of convoys and as staging points for military operations. As JAPAN's sources of supply on the periphery of her empire are cut off it is to be anticipated that the resources of INDO CHINA will be increasingly developed.

It is estimated that there are at present no more than 35,000 ground troops permanently stationed in the country, plus approximately 2,000 special Navy Landing Force troops.

There are 64 airfields, ranging from emergency fighter strips to major airports capable of handling Jap bombers. The larger fields, such as those at SAIGON, CAPE ST. JACQUES, TOURANE, CAT BAI and HAIPHONG, function not only as combat and transport plane bases, but also as training centers.

Of the ten seaplane anchorages, the best equipped ones are in the HAIPHONG-HON BAY area, at TOURANE, CAM RANH BAY, and CAPE ST. JACQUES. The air force in INDO-CHINA is believed to consist mainly of float planes and flying boats for convoy coverage and anti-submarine patrol.

(At this point in Exhibit No. 3, the following items appear:

1. Outline map of Thailand and French Indo-China.
2. Aerial photograph of Cat Bai Airfield.
3. Aerial photograph of Hon Gay, the chief coaling port of French Indo-China.
4. Aerial photograph of Cam Ranh Bay.

The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 29, 30, 31, and 32, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[55]

JAP ORDNANCE VS ALLIED AIRCRAFT

Improvisation in Japanese ordnance to combat strafing Allied planes continues. The latest development—the use of implanted bombs—is described in a report from the Central Pacific dated 23 September 1944 and forwarded by BuOrd.

Selecting the logical paths of approach of low-flying Allied planes on strafing missions, the Japanese had buried the bombs in definite patterns on all sides of the air strip. Particular attention was given to the approaches of revetments and the main parking areas on the field.

Examination of the bombs revealed they were rigged in the following manner.

- a). The nose cavity of each bomb was filled with either Composition C or dynamite. About one fourth of the bomb noses were filled with the plastic explosive and the remaining three fourths were filled with dynamite.
- b). The explosive was tamped into the nose cavity and electric blasting caps inserted into the explosive.
- c). The electric blasting caps were wired in series and had 2 leads running to a dugout. The observer, hidden in the dugout, could detonate the bombs when the strafing planes were immediately over the mined area. Each of the five areas had lead wires running to a separate

dugout. The bombs were buried and well concealed with either sod or coconut leaves and would not be visible from the air.

It is interesting to note that the Japs employed no particular type or size bomb for this purpose. Over 150 bombs rigged with electrical detonators and ranging in size from 32 kg. to 250 kg. were rendered safe.

Other instances of Japanese ingenuity in organizing and planning defenses against low-flying aircraft are reported in Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 40, Air Command, Southeast Asia. A brief resume of unorthodox and impromptu defenses encountered by airmen in this theatre includes small arms fire by ground troops, multi-barrelled MG's mounted on trucks and anti-aircraft guns mounted on freight cars.

Among the more ingenious devices employed in the Southwestern Pacific area, was a BETTY (medium bomber) conveniently parked at the end of a runway offering an unusually easy target. Unfortunately machine gun pits containing 20 mm guns had been dug in the shadow of the wings. The attacking fighters received a very warm reception. In other cases of this type, trucks, tanks, huts and barges have been substituted for the BETTY as bait.

Another type of defense against strafing is the use of wires, strung across narrow valleys, between large trees and between small hills on either side of the river. Bridges, railroads and landing strips have been reported as having possible trip-wires either over them or guarding the open approaches.

[56] Other areas have reported the use of a type of 70-mm mortar. The projectile is reported to burst between 1500 and 2000 feet, ejecting 7 canisters which in turn release parachute-suspended bomb tubes. These take two or three minutes to float to the ground and constitute a definite hazard as they are difficult to see. If contact is made with one of the suspending cords, it causes the bomb to explode with a detonation described as about twice that of a 20-mm shell.

JAP ANTI-SUBMARINE BOMB

The enemy is having trouble because his anti-submarine bombs ricochet. In the case of their 300-kg. bomb (Type 1, No. 25 bomb, Mark 2, Model 1, Modification 1) the Japs have attempted to correct this with an anti-ricochet nose attachment. Photographs of an altered bomb captured on GUAM and examined by MEIU No. 4 show the steel cylinder which is secured to the nose of the bomb by welding. This type of alteration should prove reasonably effective.

(A photograph referred to in the foregoing paragraph, being of an altered Japanese bomb captured on Guam, will be found reproduced as Item No. 33, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[5] WEEKLY COVERAGE REPORT

Photos received at CinCPac-CinCPOA during period from 24 November 1944 to and including 1 December 1944

*Prints only received; **Sorties distributed]

JAPAN

Kyushu: Good vertical partial coverage of Sasebo and Nagasaki

V/O	F. L.	Alt.	Sortie No.	Jicpoa #	Date taken
V-----	154.9 mm.	32,500'	M10/258-21P-----	9225-41-----	10/31**

CHINA: Good split-vertical and vertical coverage of areas indicated

V-----	152.6 mm.	32,000'	MR7-14PL-----	9240-153-----	9/29
V-----	6''-----	32,600'	M13/5C-21PS (Amoy A/D)-----	9230-222-----	1/23
V-----	24''-----	25,600'	M13/5C-21PS (Amoy A/D)-----	9231-223-----	1/23
V-----	6''-----	50,450'	M11/6C-21PS (Amoy Is.)-----	9232-224-----	11/7
Split Vert.	24''-----	22,450'	M11/6C-21PS (Amoy Is.)-----	9233-225-----	11/7
				9234-225-----	
V-----	6''-----	29,300'	M7/2-9PS-A1 (Shanghai)-----	9237-226-----	7/12
Split Vert.	24''-----	20,000'	4MA3-24CM (Amoy Vic. to (W. of Chelin).-----	9241-227-----	8/8**
				9242-227-----	

Photos received at CinCPac.CinCPOA during period from 24 November 1944 to and including 1 December 1944—Continued

CHINA: Good split-vertical and vertical converge of areas indicated—Continued

V/O	F. L.	Alt.	Sortie No.	Jicpoa #	Date taken
Split Vert...	24''	20,000'	4MA3-24CM (Linyeung to Shalung).	9249-228	8/8**
Split Vert...	24''	20,000'	4MA3-24CM (Chinkanchi to San-lui Vic.).	9250-228 9251-229 9252-229 9253-229 9254-229	8/8**
Split Vert...	24''	20,000'	4MA3-24CM (Chungtung to S. of Paotai).	9255-230 9256-230 9257-230 9258-230	8/8**
Split Vert...	24''	20,000'	4MA3-24CM (Swatow to Amoy Vic.).	9259-231 9260-231 9261-231 9262-231	8/8**
V.....	24''	7,300'	21PR-4MB201 (Sanchiosze-Hweilung Kiao Area).	9265-232	9/21**
V.....	24''	9,000'	21PR-4MB201 (Tanganhsien).	9266-233	9/21**
V.....	24''	14,000'	21PR-4MB201 (Chiting).	9267-234	9/21**
Split Vert...	24''	20,000'	24CM-4MA1 (Nanya to Saikiao).	9314-235 9315-235	7/27**
Split Vert...	24''	20,000'	24CM-4MA1 (Yentien to Kwanyinting).	9316-236 9317-236	7/27**
Split Vert...	24''	20,000'	24CM-4MA1 (NW Naushan N Pingtan).	9318-237 9319-237	7/28**
Split Vert...	24''	20,000'	24CM-4MA1 (N Pingtan to SE Santu to Liutu).	9320-238 9321-238	7/28**
Split Vert...	24''	20,000'	24CM-4MA1 (Lintu to S of Foochow).	9422-239 9323-239	7/28**
Split Vert...	24''	20,000'	24CM-4MA1 (S Foochow to N Hingwa).	9324-240 9325-240	7/28**
Split Vert...	24''	20,000'	24CM-4MA1 (N Hingwa to Melchowcheng).	9326-241 9327-241	7/28**
Split Vert...	24''	20,000'	24CM-4MA1 (Linchow to Kweilin).	9328-242 9329-242	7/25**
Split Vert...	24''	18,500'	24CM-4MA2 (Kitung to 8 Mi W Sungki).	9347-243 9348-243	8/7**
Split Vert...	24''	18,500'	24CM-4MA2 (8 Mi W Sungki to Kuaotow).	9349-244 9350-244 9351-244 9352-244	8/7**
Split Vert...	24''	18,500'	24CM-4MA2 (Linyang to Paishih).	9353-245 9354-245 9355-245 9356-245	8/7**
Split Vert...	24''	18,500'	24CM-4MA2 (6 Mi S Siaoma to 10 Mi SE Kuaotow—10 Mi W Kuaotow to Haoscash).	9357-246 9358-246	8/7**
Split Vert...	24''	18,500'	24CM-4MA2 (8 Mi NW Juian to Changyang).	9359-247 9360-247	8/7**
Split Vert...	24''	18,500'	24CM-4MA2 (Fengwei to Amoy).	9361-248 9362-248	8/7**
V.....	24''	18,500'	24CM-4MA2 (Amoy to Paishuiying).	9363-249	8/7**
Split Vert...	24''	20,000'	24CMS-4M9-62A (26° 50' N, 117° 57' E to 26° 50' N, 119° 24' E).	9395-250 9396-250	9/16**
Split Vert...	24''	20,000'	24CMS-4M9-21A (24° 50' N, 118° 10' E to 25° 42' N, 118° 53' E).	9397-251 9398-251	9/17**
Split Vert...	24''	20,000'	24CMS-4M9-21B (25° 48' N, 118° 59' E to 26° 20' N, 119° 29' E).	9399-252 9400-252	9/17**
V.....	24''	30,000'	21PR-4MB21 (Canton, White Cloud & Tienho A/Ds).	9493-277	3/13**
V.....	24''	30,000'	21PR-4MB21 (Whampoa Docks).	9494-278	3/13**
V.....	24''	30,000'	21PR-4MB21 (Kowloon and Hongkong).	9495-279	3/13**

BONIN GROUP: Nanpo Shoto

Chichi Jima: Good vertical and oblique partial coverage showing bomb damage

V.....	24''	17,000'	C-840-26BS-4-11-65	9401-184	11/23**
V.....	24''	17,000'	B-933-26BS-4-11-65	9402-185	11/23**
V.....	12''	17,000'	A-002-26BS-4-11-65	9403-186	11/23**
V.....	24''	18,500'	A-974-38BS-4M30-71	9404-187	11/24**
V.....	24''	18,500'	B-973-38BS-4M30-71	9405-188	11/24**
V.....	20''	19,450'	C-617-38BS-4M30-71	9406-189	11/24**
O.....	63 1/8''	200'	A-682-42BS	9407-190	11/17**
O.....	63 1/8''	200'	B-662-42BS	9408-191	11/17**
O.....	63 1/8''	200'	C-327-42BS	9409-192	11/17

Photos received at CinCPac-CinCPOA during period from 24 November 1944 to and including 1 December 1944—Continued

BONIN GROUP: Nanpo Shoto—Continued

V/O	F. L.	Alt.	Sortie No.	Jicpoa #	Date taken
V	24''	18,900'	A-526-819BS-4M30-71	9454-193	11/24**
V	24''	17,500'	C-674-819BS-4M30-71	9455-194	11/24
V	12''	17,500'	D-527-819BS-4M30-71	9456-195	11/24**
V	24''	16,000'	A-873-98BS-11-65-7BC	9457-196	11/23**
V	12''	17,000'	B-876-98BS-11-65-7BC	9458-197	11/23**
V	24''	17,000'	C-951-98BS-11-65-7BC	9459-198	11/23**
O	12''	200'	A-016-431BS-4-11-64	9474-199	11/23**
V	40''	20,000'	VD5-1A	9475-200	11/25**
V	40''	20,000'	VD5-1C	9476-201	11/25**
V	40''	20,000'	VD5-1D	9477-202	11/25**
V	24''	20,000'	VD5-1E	9478-203	11/25**
V	24''	20,000'	VD5-1G	9479-204	11/25**
V	24''	20,000'	VD5-1H	9480-205	11/25**

Haha Jima: Good vertical and oblique partial coverage showing bomb damage

V	12''	11,720'	A-948-38BS-4M30-55	9193-71	11/8**
O	12''	12,725'	A-491-98BS-7BC	9194-72	11/9**
O	24''	12,750'	B-951-98BS-7BC	9195-73	11/9**
V	12''	13,000'	A-153-431BS-47	9196-74	11/9**
V	24''	16,500'	A-661-819BS-4M30-53	9197-75	11/6
O	6 3/8''		No data	9198-76	
O	12''	200'	A-016-431BS-4-11-64	9471-77	11/23**
V	24''	14,500'	B-223-431BS-4-11-61	9472-78	11/21**
V	12''	11,400'	B-683-819BS-4M30-71	9473-79	11/24**
V	12''	14,000'	A-016-431BS-4-11-64	9470-80	11/23**
V	40''	20,000'	VD5-2A	9481-81	11/25**
V	24''	20,000'	VD5-2H	9482-82	11/25**

Nishino Shima: Distant oblique partial coverage

O	6 3/8''	Var	VB102-18	9216-6	11/7**
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KAZAN GROUP: Nanpo Shoto

Iwo Jima: Good vertical partial coverage of island in color

V	24''	20,000'	VD4-97	9219-261	11/19
V	24''	20,000'	VD4-97	9220-262	11/19
V	24''	20,000'	VD4-97	9221-263	11/19
V	24''	20,000'	VD4-97	9222-264	11/19

MARCUS: Nanpo Shoto—Good complete vertical coverage

V	24''	17,000'	A-880-26BS	9199-36	11/7**
V	12''	13,300'	A-998-392BS-4M30-55	9200-37	11/9**
V	21''	18,000'	A-846-98BS-7BC	9201-38	11/7

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

Cebu: Good trimetrogon partial coverage

Tri	6''	13,500'	Essex-131 (V)	9213-83	9/13**
Met			Essex-131 (P)	9214-83	
			Essex-131 (S)	9215-83	

Negros: Good trimetrogon partial coverage

Tri	6''	13,500'	Essex-131 (V)	9210-65	9/13**
Met			Essex-131 (P)	9211-65	
			Essex-131 (S)	9212-65	

Photos received at CinCPac-CinCPOA during period from 24 November 1944 to and including 1 December 1944—Continued

PHILIPPIOE ISLANDS

Luzon: Good split-vertical and oblique coverage of areas indicated

V/O	F. L.	Alt.	Sortie No.	Jicpoa #	Date taken
Split Vert...	24''	Var	CV16-2652 (Manila)	9263-132	11/5**
O	6 3/8''	Var	CV16-2653	9264-132	
O	6 3/8''	Var	Tico-5 (Manila)	9268-133	11/5**
O	6 3/8''	Var	Tico-6 (Manila)	9269-134	11/5**
O	6 3/8''	Var	Tico-7 (Manila)	9270-135	11/5**
O	6 3/8''	Var	Tico-8 (Manila)	9271-136	11/5**
O	6 3/8''	Var	Tico-9 (Manila)	9272-137	11/5**
O	6 3/8''	Var	Tico-10 (Manila)	9273-138	11/5**
O	6 3/8''	Var	Tico-11 (Manila)	9274-139	11/5**
O	6 3/8''	Var	Tico-12 (Manila)	9275-140	11/5**
O	6 3/8''	Var	Tico-14 (Manila)	9276-141	11/5**
O	6 3/8''	Var	Tico-15 (Manila)	9277-142	11/5**
O	6 3/8''	Var	Tico-16 (Manila)	9278-143	11/5**
O	8 1/2''	Var	Tico-17 (Manila)	9279-144	11/6**
[58] O	6 3/8''	Var	CV11-125 (North Tip)	9280-145	10/18**
O	6 3/8''	Var	CV11-111 (North Tip)	9281-146	10/18**
O	6 3/8''	Var	CV11-1 (North Tip)	9282-147	10/18**
O	6 3/8''	Var	CV11-114 (North Tip)	9283-148	10/18**
O	6 3/8''	Var	CV11-126 (North Tip)	9284-149	10/18**
O	6 3/8''	Var	CV11-113 (North Tip)	9285-150	10/18**
O	6 3/8''	Var	CV11-107 (North Tip)	9286-151	10/18**
O	6 3/8''	Var	CV11-112 (North Tip)	9287-152	10/18**
O	6 3/8''	Var	Frank-149 (Manila Bay)	9288-153	10/18**
O	6 3/8''	Var	CV127-201 (Manila Bay)	9289-154	11/6**
O	6 3/8''	Var	CV127-196 (Manila Bay)	9290-155	11/5**
O	6 3/8''	Var	CV127-198 (Manila Bay)	9291-156	11/5**
O	6 3/8''	Var	CV127-202 (Manila Bay)	9292-157	11/6**
O	6 3/8''	Var	CV127-197 (Manila Bay)	9293-158	11/5**
O	6 3/8''	Var	CV127-199 (Manila Bay)	9294-159	11/5**
O	6 3/8''	Var	CV16-2649 (Manila Bay)	9295-160	11/5**
O	6 3/8''	Var	CV16-2651 (Manila Bay)	9296-161	11/5**
O	6 3/8''	Var	BKHL-366	9297-162	10/18**
O	6 3/8''	Var	BKHL-367	9298-163	10/18**
O	6 3/8''	Var	BKHL-368	9299-164	10/18**

FORMOSA: Good split-vertical coverage of areas indicated

Split Vert...	24''	30,000'	21PH-4MB163 (Takao A/D & Docks)	9243-339	9/12**
Split Vert...	24''	29,800'	21PR-4MB163 (Sikano A/F)	9244-339	
				9245-340	9/12**
Split Vert...	24''	29,500'	21PR-4MB163 (Taito A/D)	9246-340	
				9247-341	9/12**
				9248-341	

MALAY STATES: Good vertical coverage of Singapore

V	24''	22,070'	(444BG) (4MB15) (444-AC352)	9340-2	11/5**
V	6''	21,500'	(462BG) (4MB15) (462-AC475)	9341-3	11/5**
V	12''	22,900'	(444BC) (4MB15) (444-AC492)	9342-4	11/5**
V	12''	21,000'	(444BC) (4MB15) (444-AC411)	9343-5	11/5**
V	24''	22,000'	(444BC) (4MB15) (444-AC584)	9344-6	11/5**
V	24''	22,300'	(444BC) (4MB15) (444-AC485)	9345-7	11/5**
V	24''	22,300'	(444BC) (4MB15) (444-AC419)	9346-8	11/5**
V	24''	21,300'	(462BG) (4MB15) (462-AC382)	9364-9	11/5**
V	24''	21,300'	(462BG) (4MB15) (462-AC581)	9365-10	11/5**

BURMA: Good vertical coverage of areas indicated

			(Rangoon)		
V	24''	24,000'	(462BC) (4MB14) (462-AC-581)	9366-3	11/3**
V			(462BC) (4MB14) (462-AC329)	9367-4	11/3**
V			(462BC) (4MB14) (462-AC479)	9368-5	11/3**
V	12''	21,400'	(462BC) (4MB15) (462-AC479)	9369-6	11/5**
V	40''	23,500'	(462BC) (4MB13) (462-AC444)	9370-7	11/3**
V			(462BC) (4MB14) (462-AC475)	9364-8	11/3**
V	24''	23,500'	(462BC) (4MB14) (462-AC463)	9371-9	11/3**
V	24''	22,000'	(462BC) (4MB14) (462-AC461)	9372-10	11/3**
V	24''		(462BC) (4MB14) (462-AC506)	9373-11	11/3**
V	24''	22,000'	(444BG) (4MB14) (444-AC485)	9374-12	11/3**
V	24''	22,000'	(444BG) (4MB14) (444-AC419)	9375-13	11/3**

Photos received at CinCPac-CinCPOA during period from 24 November 1944 to and including 1 December 1944--Continued

BURMA: Good vertical coverage of areas indicated--Continued

V/O	F. L.	Alt.	Sortie No.	Jicpoa #	Date taken
V	24''	22,000'	(444BG) (4MB14) (444-AC580)	9376-14	11/3**
V	40''	22,000'	(444BG) (4MB14) (444-AC524)	9377-15	11/3**
V	24''	22,000'	(444BG) (4MB14) (444-AC411)	9378-16	11/3**
V	24''	21,000'	(14PL) (4MB14) (468-AC525)	9379-17	11/3**
V	24''	21,400'	(14PL) (4MB14) (468-AC494)	9380-18	11/3**
V	12''	21,500'	(14PL) (4MB14) (468-AC546)	9381-19	11/3**
V	40''	21,200'	(14PL) (4MB14) (468-AC469)	9382-20	11/3**
V	24''	21,000'	(11PL) (4MB14) (40-AC508)	9383-21	11/3**
V	12''	20,500'	(11PL) (4MB14) (40-AC452)	9384-22	11/3**
V	12''	21,000'	(11PL) (4MB14) (40-AC574)	9385-23	11/3**
V	12''	20,800'	(11PL) (4MB14) (40-AC541)	9386-24	11/3**
V	12''	16,500'	(Taungup) (444BG) (4MB14) (444-AC202)	9387-25	11/3**

SUMATRA: Good vertical coverage of area indicated

V	24''	21,300'	(444BG) (4MB15) (444-AC580) (Pangalan Brandan)	9388-4	11/5**
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CAROLINE ISLANDS

Palau: Good vertical and oblique coverage of areas indicated

V	24''	14,800'	28PR4MB77-1 (Babelthuap A/F)	9421-475	11/1
V	40''	14,000'	28PR4MB90-1 (Babelthuap A/F)	9422-476	11/5
V	40''	13,000'	28PR4MB94-1 (Babelthuap A/F)	9423-477	11/9
V	24''	12,000'	28PR4MB82-1 (Central Harbor Area)	9424-478	11/3
V	6''	2,500'	28PR4MCB97-1 (Ngeregon Is)	9425-479	11/10
V	40''	15,000'	28PR4MB95-1 (Urukthapel Is)	9426-480	11/9
V	40''	14,000'	28PR4MB88-1	9427-481	11/5
V	40''	10,000'	28PR4MB118-1 (Urukthapel Is)	9428-482	11/15
V	12''	500'	28PR4MCB97-2 (Ngeregon Is)	9429-483	11/10
V	40''	14,000'	28PR4MB99-1 (Koror Is)	9430-484	11/9
V	40''	16,000'	28PR4MB83-1 (Koror Is)	9431-485	11/3
V	40''	15,000'	28PR4MCB104-1 (Eylmalk Is)	9432-486	11/10
O	12''	50'	28PR4MB81-1 (Ngargol Is)	9433-487	11/2
O	6 3/8''		VPB117	9434-488	11/17

Ponape: Good vertical and oblique partial coverage

O	6 3/8''	1,200'	MAC22-VMF-422-8	9311-596	11/22
O	6 3/8''	1,000'	MAC22-H4-68	9312-597	11/22
O	6 3/8''	15,000'	MAC22-VMF-113-8	9313-598	11/22
V	20''	10,000'	MAC22-7	9444-599	11/12

Pulo Anna: Good vertical partial coverage

V	40''	5,000'	28PR4MB70-1	9235-6	10/30
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Sonsorol: Good vertical and oblique partial coverage

V	40''	5,000'	28PR4MB70-1	9228-3	10/30**
O	21''	50'	28PR4MB70-3	9229-4	10/30**

Truk: Good vertical and oblique partial coverage showing bomb damage in airfield areas

V	12''	19,300'	A-236-27BS-4M30-70	9445-596	11/22
V	12''	19,400'	B-151-27BS-4M30-70	9446-597	11/22
V	12''	18,200'	C-935-27BS-4M30-70	9447-598	11/22
O	6 3/8''	18,800'	D-633-27BS-4M30-70	9448-599	11/22
O	6 3/8''	17,000'	E-810-27BS-4M30-70	9449-600	11/22
V	24''	18,000'	A-425-392BS-4M30-70	9450-601	11/22
V	24''	18,200'	B-838-392BS-4M30-70	9451-602	11/22
V	12''	17,600'	C-358-392BS-4M30-70	9452-603	11/22
O	6 3/8''	17,600'	D-358-392BS-4M30-70	9453-604	11/22

Photos received at CinCPac-CinCPOA during period from 24 November 1944 to and including 1 December 1944—Continued

MARIANAS

Aguigan: Good oblique partial coverage

V/O	F. L.	Alt.	Sortie No.	Jicpoa #	Date taken
O.....	6 $\frac{3}{8}$ "	Var.....	VB117-23.....	9218-30.....	11/15**

Farallon De Medinilla: Good complete vertical coverage

V.....	24"	13,000'	B-832-26BS.....	9469-6.....	11/23**
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Guguan: Good complete vertical coverage

V.....	24"	10,000'	23PR4MC163-1.....	9223-6.....	11/14**
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Pagan: Good oblique partial coverage

O.....	6 $\frac{3}{8}$ "	Var.....	VB117-22A.....	9227-134.....	11/14
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Rota: Good vertical and oblique partial coverage

V.....	12"	3,000'	28PR4MC167-1.....	9236-185.....	11/14**
O.....	12"	50'	28PR4MC169-1.....	9238-186.....	11/16**
O.....	12"	75'	28PR4MC170-1.....	9496-187.....	11/16**

Sarigan: Good oblique partial coverage

O.....	6 $\frac{3}{8}$ "	Var.....	VB117-22.....	9224-8.....	11/14
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Zealandria Park: Good oblique shot

O.....	6 $\frac{3}{8}$ "	Var.....	VB117-22B.....	9226-1.....	11/14
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(At this point in Exhibit No. 3, the following appear:

1. Aerial photograph of Luzon airfields, being an example of the concentration of Japanese airfields in the vicinity of Manila.
2. Aerial photograph of Grace Park Airfield, located in the northern part of Manila.
3. Aerial photograph of Legaspi Airfield.
4. Aerial photograph of Fort Stotsenburg, thought to be a Japanese Garrison Headquarters.

The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 34, 35, 36, and 36-A, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 4

(Exhibit No. 4 is a captured Japanese submarine chart, translated, showing courses and location of U. S. ships in Pearl Harbor. This chart will be found reproduced as Item No. 37, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)